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On the Classification ofEconomic
Fluctuations
ABSTRACT:Attempts to classify economic fluctuations havehistori-
cally focused mainly on the identification of turning points,that is,
so-called peaks and troughs. In this paper we report on anexperimen-
tal use of multivariate discriminant analysis to determine afour-phase
classification of the business cycle, using quarterly andmonthly U.S.
economic data for 1947-1973. Specifically, weattempted to discrimi-
nate between phases of (1) recession, (2) recovery, (3)demand-pull,
and (4) stagflation. Using these techniques, we wereable to identify
two complete four-phase cycles in the p'stwarperiod: 1949 through
1953 and 1960 through 1969. ¶ As a furher test,extrapolations were
made to periods occurring before February 1947 andalter September
1973. Using annual data for the period 1926 -1951, a"backcasting" to
the prewar U.S. economy suggests that the n.ajordifference between
prewar and postwar business cycles isthe onii:sion of the stagflation
phase in the former. Quarterly and monthly data 's'ereused to analyze
the cyclical phasing for the period October 1973through September
1974; this extrapolation strongly suggeststhat a re:ession in the U.S.
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tary policy between the private andpublic sectors. In a sense, the adveniof
the "Keynesian policy revolution"conipleted this change iii emphasis by
emphasizing the role of fiscal policy,which by definition is public in
character.
Thus, a new actor, the public sector, nowplays a prominent role ut
influencing patterns of economic fluctuations.Some, in fact, would insist
that the public sectoris today the doniinant force inshaping cyclical
activity.' Sonie observers have even gone sofar as to say that the politi-
cal cycle is the only important businesscycle still extant in the West.
The suggestion is increasingly made thatthe public sector may use its
powers to manipulate the economyto achieve political ratherthan purely
economic goalsand often in contradictionof the underlying economic
realities and priorities.
However that may be, the Keynesianrevolution and its accompaniment
of an activist role for public policy ineconomic affairs have led to agood
deal of dissatisfaction with traditional waysof viewing and classifying
cyclical phenomena. Two important changesin the empirical facts of
cyclical behavior would seem to be related tothese dissatisfactions, and
both of these changes can be deemedaccompaniments or even conse-
quences of the revolutionin public policy. The firstis the seeming
emergence of a systematicbias in public policy toward achievinglower
unemployment at the expense of somewhat greaterand more persistent
price inflation; that is, economicpolicy in Western democracies seems to
have been increasingly dominatedduring the postwar period by a willing-
ness to sacrifice more inthe way of price stability toachieve lower
unemployment. The second new systematicempirical regularity to emerge
in the "Keynesian policy era" isthat declines in absolute measuresof
output have become increasingly rarein the market economies of Europe,
Japan, and to a lesser degree,North America. It seems fair to saythat by the
usual semantics rio actual depressionhas occurred in these economies
since the end of World War II.
These empirical changes have not goneunnoticed, of course, in the
literature on business cycle chronology.Perhaps the most formal recogni-
tion of this awareness is the emergenceof so-callC(I growth cycles inwhich
a declining rate ofgrowth rather than an absolute declineIFabricant 1 9721,
defines a recession. Similarly, too,in recognition of thesystematic bias
toward price inflation, an increasingemphasis isto be found in the
taxonomic exercises on real ratherthan monetary measures. Stillanother
recognition of these same facts hasbeen the increasing emphasis onthe
GNP gap (the differences betweenpotential and actual grossnational
product) as an important measurefor setting governmentbudgets and
stabilization policies. Likewise, we arebecoming more sophisticatedabout
our definitions andanalyses of unemployment,recognizing that nationalconcept must be deemed significant adaptations and in all probability
ire improvements in the state of the art. Their utility, moreover, is likely to be
enhanced with the passage of time. Nevertheless, they may not have met
all the problems posed by the new departures in economic policy and
cyclical behavior.
On. For example, modern discussions of the business cycle, perhaps best
nal illustrated in forecasting exercises, increasingly stress the role of govern-
uncj ment in conditioning the course of events. Forecasts today tend to be
ron) conditioned on certain fiscal or monetary policy assumptions. Concomi-
hcit tantly, we hear tess about the automatic character of the cycle; that is, how
od- the cycle emerges from the interaction or feedbacks between private
lest decisions and their consequences. Private decisions are still involved, but
ing the stress is on the ability, perhaps even responsibility, of government to
elf, offset or neutralize the more adverse effects that might emerge from these
VO private decisions. Rightly or wrongly, the modern view tends to be that
e- public policy should not allow private decisions to cumulate into cyclical
us adversity. As a result, the cycle is less likely today to run its full course. At
nd least as judged by nearly three decades of experience since the end of
World War II, governments are reluctant to permit recessions, let alone
n, retrogression into depression. We may hope, as a corollary, that a full
or financial panic should also not be needed today to cure the excesses of
e. inflation and speculationthough some may remain less hopeful about
e this latter point than in our ability to prevent full-scale depressions.
In keeping with the new emphasis on the public policy role in achieving
y stabilization and growth objectives, one possible objective of taxonomy
e might be (and, indeed, increasingly is by implication if not by formal
e definition) identifying or diagnosing the current state of the economy rather
n than simply asserting when a recession has occurred. Indeed, the iden-
tification of cyclical turning points ex post (as contrasted with ex ante)
never was that overwhelmingly important from apolicy standpoint. Rather,
s it was a device for facilitating scientific and historical study ofeconomic
fluctuations, e.g., better identification of the underlying causalrelationships
or improvement of the structural specificationof an econometric model.
The public, however, always has been and remains understandably in-
terested in the identification of turning points. Perhaps morepertinently,
those charged with making policy decisions are interested notonly in
identifying turning points somewhat before the fact, but alsoin making
more elaborate diagnoses of the state ofthe economy as soon as possible.
In short, if policy is uppermost in mind, then thetemptation is to identify
the 'pathological condition" or state of the economy at differentpoints in
time as promptly as possible. Promptness or currencyin identifying the
cyclical condition almost surely explains much of thepublic interest in
National Bureau research on business cycle "indicators."It seems highly
probable, moreover, that policymakers will want to know morethan if the
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ifwhether some separately definable stage sometimes does exist after the
demand-pull and before the recession, but rather how to describe it, and
flianyparticulaily how Lu label itstuses. Thus, in many discussions it might be
Ct termed a cost-push inflation. Others, though, would insist that such a
maycost-push is simply a winding down of classical inflation. This in turn leads
bruptto a policy debate about whether stagliation or cost-push is an entirely
terns,different breed of economic condition requiring new and different policies,
cord,such as wage and price controls. Following National Bureau tradition, no
the position will be adopted on these policy issues here. Rather, the focus will
ndi- be on determining whether real empirical delineations corresponding to
this four-stage scheme can be identified in the economy. The obvious time
y to period in which to test for such phenomena would be post-World War Il,
iffer. that is. the period roughly corresponding to the new cyclical circumstances
in and the availability of good quarterly and monthly data on aggregate
ting economic performance.
be
at 11111 METHODS AND VARIABLES
ni-
ity From an empirical standpoint, taxonomy can be posed as a reasonably
straightforward problem in multivariate discriminant analysis. The basic
ye objective of discriminant analysis is to classify an observation (for which
the defining characteristicis not available or observable) into one of
a several groups on the basis of available data or variables other than the
defining characteristic. Strictly speaking, the estimation of the classificatory
is discriminant function should be based on prior sample observations for
which the correct classification has been established, that is, for which we
know the basic defining characteristics. Clearly, userul independent van-
ables for performing a classification under these circumstances would be
those for which the average values in the different identifiable groups are
substantially different. Conversely, if the values or average for a variable
were essentially the same in all groups, that variable would beof little use
for classification.
MOre formally,let us assert that we can identify k groups in our
population. (In our cyclical analysis these k groups would be the different
cyclical phases or stages.) We can also observe values for m independent
variables for all of our units of observation belonging to these different k
groups. (For our cyclical problemthese m variables would typically be
different time series values, such as prices or productivity, associated with
general economic performance, and the unit of observation would be a
month or a quarter.) For a sample with known group identities, multivariate
discriminant analysis may be interpreted as maximizing the between-group
distance of the k group means of the set of m variables (x1, x2, x3, ..., x)
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while minimizing the within-groupvariance. That is, we desire topartition the rn-dimensionalSdtC into k disjoint subsets L1, L 2,...,LL, suchthat if
an "individual" is characterized by a vectorx(x1, x2,..., xv,) andx
belongs to the subset E7, then thatindividual is classified into therth
population. Again, rigorously, thecorrect population or group identityto which an individual belongs shouldbe known for the sampleused to
establish the discriminant functions.Once estimated, thediscrirninant
functions can then be used to classifynew individuals whose populatjoror group identity is unknown but for whomobservation values areavailable on the m independent variables.
Graphically we might portray thesituation as shown in Figure1. In this
graph four hypothetical distributionscorresponding to recession,recovery, stagflation, and demand-pullare shown with different centraltendencies or mean values for price increase andgrowth rate characteristics.As drawn, stagflation is a situationcharacterized by price increasesbut low growth;
recession, a period in which bothgrowth arid price increasesare low; demand-pull, a situation in whichboth are high; andrecovery, a period that combines low priceincreases with high growthrates. (Again, it should be stressed thatat this point the exampleis strictly hypotheticaland illustrative!) An obviousnext step in any classificationexercise would be to draw lines on the graphso as to divide the space into fourregions closely corresponding to the underlyinggroups. Lines A and B in thegraph illustrate that step. Thus,if we obtainedresults like those shownin the graph for our sampleobservations about whichwe know the defining characteristics we wouldthen have a basis forclassifying new observa- tions for which the definingcharacteristic was not evident.Specifically, if a new observation had valuesthat fell in thenortheast quadrantas formed by the lines A and B,we would classify itas demand-pull An observationin the southwestquadrant would becharacterized asrecession; one in the northwest, as stagflation;and one in thesoutheast, asrecovery That is, any new observation forwhich the definingcharacteristic was not known could be simplyclassified into itsmost likely group accordingto the quadrant or region intowhich itfell, thesequadrants or regions being determined by theoriginal analysis. Inessence discriminant analysisis nothing more thana formal applicationof these basicnotions. From a strictly formal







Specifically, we started with existing National Bureau definitions for
recessions. These block out (define) five segments in the postwar period:
December 1948 to October 1949, August 1953 to August 1954, August
1957 to April 1958, june 1960 to February 1961, and December 1969 to
November 1970. For the other stages, a bit of common sense reinforced by
some knowledge of recent business cyclehistory can carry the analysis a
considerable distance. For example, the onset of demand-pull inflation is
commonly associated both with the third quarter of 1950 because of the
Korean War and with mid-1965 because of the Vietnambuildup that
escalated sharply starting in July of that year. Similarly, the years justafter
the end of World War II, particularly from mid-1946 until mid-i 948, are
associated with decontrolof thewartime economy and substantia!
demand-pull inflation. With somewhat less certainty, the secondhalf of
1955 and all of 1956 might be termed a period ofdemand-pull inflation
merging into stagflation late in 1956 or early in 1957.It is more difficult
to specify any period between the trough of 1958and peak of mid-i 960 as
demand-pull, but if it happened it was probably in 1959. By a processof
elimination, recoveries have to be periods that occurbefore these
demand-pull periods but after the preceding recessions;and stagflations
must occur, if at all, after demand-pulls but beforethe next recession. The
a priori classification of periodsevolved through such considerations is
shown in Table 1.
Using these preliminary classifications, weanalyzed time series data on
the performance of the U.S. economy starting withFebruary 1947 charac-
terized as a demand-pull month. Boundary monthsbetween different
cyclical phases as tentatively identified in Table 1 wereleft to be classified

































nTABLE 1Preliminary (A Priori) Classification of U.S. Business


























meant assigning no prior identity to boundary months whereas all other
months, being established periods, were given an exact identity. Formally,
since we used a Bayesian discriminant analysis, this meant assigning
diffuse or null prior probabilities to the boundary months. Adjustmentsin
the stage definitions were then made to minimize misclassificationsat
boundaries. As the analysis proceeded, comparisonswere made with
original NBER definitions of recession and nonrecession periods in thelight
of the behavior of various time series. Ad hoc adjustments in thebound-
aries were undertaken in a few instances where therewere differences
between the established NBER definitions of recessionperiods and those
yielded by the discriminant functions. In short, thenew phase definitions,
as described in the next section, were establisSed byan interplay of
common sense, the usual National Bureau considerations in dating cycles,
and the more mechanistic procedures of thediscriminant analysis.
Selection of the variables used in the initial discriminantan was
done through a generalsurvey of the literature. In general, the choke of
variables was suggested by the policy and historicalconsiderations andy
discussed. More narrowly, variables thathad fIired promi in the
development of formal econometric modelsof the U.S. economy or had
been singled out as particularlysensitive cyclical indicators (in previous
NBER studies or elsewhere)were given special attention. Thov.rtgM
not available for the entire time period of theanalysis, 1947 thiough 1973,
were eliminated. The variables actually used for theclassification e'iecci
can be found in Table 3, along with theiraverage values tar the
finally established.
LIVI A FOUR-PHASE DISCRIMP4ANTANALYSIS OF THE
POST-WOD WAR II U.S. CYCUC1 RIENCL
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J947-1 973 seemedable to identify or differentiate between two essentially
complete four-stagecycles in the postwar period: 1949 through 1953 and
i960 through 1969.Moreover, the months before the recession of 1949
seemed marked by stagflationand demand-pull, as the conceptual scheme
would suggest. The yearsafter 1969 also seemed to repeat the basic
cyclical structure1970 was a year of recession, 1971 and 1972 were
years of recOvery,1973 was a year of demand-pull. In addition, theperiod
from 1953 to 1958could be defined as either a four-stage cycle, inwhich
the fourth stage,stagliation or cost-push, was extremelyabbreviated, or as
a three-stagecycle, in which the stagflation phase wastotally eliminated.
We finally adopted athree- rather than a four-stage characterizationfor
those mid-i 950 years.One truncated or two-stage cycleoccurred between
1958 and 1960.Classification of the phases by monthsfrom mid-1948
through September 1973 (thelast date for which we had adequatedata
when we did our originalclassification analyses) can be found inTable 2.
The posterior classificationsof each month from February 1947through
September 1973 alongwith the probabilities characterizingeach of the
four phases of thebusiness cycle can be found inAppendix A.
On the whole, theimpressionistic or prior classificationsoutlined in the
previous section andshown in Table 1respond remarkablyvell to
discriminant tests or classifications.As noted, the only major instancein
which the four-way priorspecification seemed to fail totally wasin the
years 1958through 1 960. In that periodthe economy appears to have
moved from recession to recoveryto recession withoutpassing through
either a demand-pull orcost-push stage or any other typeof major
inflationary experienceand eventhis was not totally unexpected.The
1958-1959 recovery hasoften been described as aborted orshort-lived
in the literature and injournalistic accounts. Moreover,there is no reason
why all four stages must occur.The economic re-entryproblem (from too
fast to sustainable growth)might be characterized asfinding a way to make
TABLE 2Final Classification of U.S.Business
Cycles into a Four-StageScheme, February 1947-
September 1973
- Starting Datesbr
Recession Recovery Demand-Pull Stagulation
May 1948
December 1948 November 1949 July 1950 lanuary 1951
November 1953 August 1954 March 1955
September 1957 May 1958 -
lune 1960 February 1961 May 1965 December 1967
preced- January 1970 December 1970 Januar 1973
C years)
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the transition froni demand-pull back to recovery without experiencing
recession (a feat, incidentally, not achieved in the United States during the
period analyzed, that is, since 1947). Similarly, there is nothing necessariI'
inevitable about so much fiscal or monetary stimulus being applied thatall
recoveries must end in demand-pull inflations. In keeping with the niodern
emphasis on the responsibility of public policy for the course of the cycle,
it might be anticipated that truly wise (or lucky!) policy decisions could
avert this outcome.
The average values for the variables used in carrying out the classifica..
tion scheme for the different cyclical stages as defined in Table 2are
shown in Table 3. These averages more or less conform withprior
expectations about the differences in the different cyclical stages.Prices
and labor costs rise much less rapidly on average in recession andrecovery
than in either of the inflationary periods. Recovery in particularis a period
when productivity surges; as a result, the gap between unit laborcost and
price increases is largest in that stage and therefore almost certainlymost
favorable to business profitability. On the other hand,recovery and
demand-pull are the periods in which theeconomy expands in real terms.
Recession is characterized by actual decline in realgross national product
(GNP), while in stagflation theeconomy experiences only modest growth.
Stagilation or cost-push also seems to bea periodin which leading
indications of incipient recessionappear: rates of increase in New York
Stock Exchange prices begin to declineeven as output continues to grow,
and rates of increase in wholesaleprices turn sharply downward even
though consumer prices continue upwardat a vigorous rate. Government
fiscal policy also seems to followconventional prescriptions: thoughgross
government expenditures expand sharply withinflation, the net fiscal
positionisone of deficitsin recession and recovery, of surplusin
demand-pull, and slight surplusin stagflation. Monetary policy alsoseems
to move parallel to real GNP growth,as might be expected, though it
might be deemed bysome to be too permissive in times of inflation and
somewhat too constraining duringrecession. Gestation lags, ofcourse,
could alter and certainly wouldcomplicate these judgments.
A discriminant function,as noted,iscreated by attaching different
weights to different variablesso as to maximize the differences in thegroup
weighted mean differences(i.e., in the groupmean discrimiriant scores,
with the groups here beingthe recession,recovery, demand-pull, or stagfla- tion months). Ona conventional F test, thesemean discriminant scores are
significantly different for the differentgroups. As might be expected the two
inflation periods are the leastdifferentiated, buteven their F test is at a
level three times the F valueassociated with 1per cent significance for such a sample. Stagflatjonand recovery, bycontrast, are the most sharply







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eTABLE 4Significance of Mean Discriminant ScoreDifferences
[F matrixdegrees of freedom for eah F statistic:F(20, 297)[
Recession Recovery Deiiiand-Pu II
Two canonical functions seem to be quite sufficient to IJerformthe basic
discrimination (as shown by the eigenvalues and cumulativeproportions of
"explained" dispersion at the bottom of Table 5). Moreover, thefunctions
can he interpreted in a reasonably straightforward way by looking at the
weights or coefficients shown in the second and third columns of the table.
The first function apparently differentiates by unemployment, interestrate
changes, productivity, and Price behavior; it thus separates recession and
recovery from the two inflationary periods. Specifically, high unemploy-
ment rates, good productivity gains, negative changes in corporate bond
rates, and small to negative price changes will yield a high negative score
on this index; opposite conditions will register positively. The second
canonical function apparently adds only alittle to the differentiation,
mainly in terms of interest rate behavior. This apparently helps somewhat
in separating the "real growth" stages, recovery and demand-pull, from the
no-growth or monetary-only growth periods, recession and stagflation. The
foregoing behavior is shown graphically by the plot of theanonical
variates in Figure 2. The first canonical is plotted against the horizontal axis
and the second against the vertical axis. Thus, against the vertical axis, the
minus-growth period of recession is entirely in the upper half while stagfla-
tion tends in that direction. For the first canonical plotted on the horizontal
axis, the relatively price-stable periods of recession and recovery are on the
right-hand or positive side of the diagram, whereas the two inflationary
periods are on the left, with the stagilation period being further separated
from the demand-pull by recording substantially more negative scores on
average on the first canonical variable.s
An interesting test of the basic discriminant concept (as of almost any
statistical time series analysis) is to extrapolate the analyses to periods
beyond the historical data for which the original functional parameters
were estimated. In the present case, the obvious test periods would be
those occurring before 1947 and after September 1973, that is, before and
after the period used for the basic analysis. For these extrapolations, clittuse
or null prior Probabilities6 would appear appropriate.
Attempting to backcast to the period prior to147 one immediately
encounters the difficulty that good quarterly data are simply not available.
However, fourteen of the civarterly or monthly variables used in the basic









IF 5Summary Tables with Canonical Discriminant AnalysisResults
Associated eigenvalues
Cumulative proportion of total
dispersion explained
SOURCE:See Appendix U.
Seasonalty adjusted atan annual rate.
bper cent change;seasonally adjusted at an annualrate. Change per month.
dper cent change.
least an annual basis backto 1920. These fourteenvariables are designaled by an AH entry in thefar right or availabilitycolumn of Table 3. To backcast, thediscriminant functionswere redefined using monthly observations for thosefourteen series onlyfor February 1947through September 1973. From thenewly
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and stagflation can be estimated for each of the years 1 92() through 1951
using annual data only. The classifications and probabilitiesderived from
this extrapolation exercise arc shown in Table 6.
The historical record with which these historical hackcastswould seem
best compared is that of the NBER business cycle chronology.Actually, the ed
National Bureau has defined recession periods for the U.S. economygoing
back before 1900; those for the years after 1920 are shown inTable 7.
Obviously, many recessions have lasted more than a year. Sin':e wedo not gh
have a full set of monthly or quarterly data for the interwar period,detailed ii-
turning points cannot be specified in the historical extrapolation.In spite 01
Its FIGURE 2Plots of First and Second Canonical Discrim-
inant Valuest
/ /
TABLE 6Posterior Probabilities of the Four BusinessCycle
Phases for 1920-1951 Based onExtrapolations of
Postwar (1947- 1973) DiscriminantAnalyses
Year Recession Recovery i)emand-l'u II Stagilat ion
Moi probable grou p.
this data handicap, the extrapolations reported in Table 6agree remarkably
well with the formal NBER chronology and also withcommon sense. The
onlyNBER-designatedrecessionsnotobservableinthehistoric,il
extrapolations-and this may simply reilect the lack ot nionthly data-are
the relatively mild 1926-1927 and1 945 episodes: the 1927 recessiOn
lasted barely a year and the minirecession of1945 had a duration of less
1920 0.000 I). '018 (1.002 13.001)
192 I I .000, 0.00) 1)000 0.000
1922 0.01) I ft939' 0.000 0.01)0
192.3 0.000 0.025 0.893' ((.081
1924 0.999' 0.001 0.000 0.000
1925 0.000 0.988' (1.007 (1.003
1926 0.000 0 0(13) 0. 08 0.692'
1927 0.001 0.003 0.937' (1.039
1928 0.001) 0.005 0.002' (1(8)3
I 929 0.000 0 000 0.906' 0.18)4
1930 I .000W 0.000 0.000 0.00))
1931 0.999' 0.001 11.000 0.000
1932 I .800' 0.000 0.000 0.000
1933 0.032 0.968 1)1)00 0.018)
1934 0.032 0.968' 0.000 0.000
1935 0.000 I .008' 0.000 13.000
1936 0.000 I .000' 0.000 0.000
1937 0.001 0.999' 0.000 0.000
938 0.995 0.005 1)001) 0.000
1939 0.013 0.987' 0.000 11.000
1940 0.020 0.980 0.000 0.000
I 941 0.050 0.930 0.000 0.000
1942 0.000 0.000 0.001) 3.000'
1943 0.000 0.000 0.00(3 1.1)00'
1944 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000'
1945 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.01)0'
(946 0.000 0001) 0.001 0.999'
(947 0.001 0.009 0.895' 0.095
1948 0.001) 0.000 0.988' 0.012
1949 0.940' 0.058 0.002 0.000
1950 0.81)1 0.119 0.843' 0.036
1951 0.000 0.000 0.893 0.11)5The period betuen ihe peak and the trougti can be tonsiderd
a recesiorl.
than one year. The Great Depression of the early1 930s is unmistakable,
with three years of recession being recorded in 1930,1931, and 1932.
Similarly, the sharp downturn of1 938 is clearly noted.
The four-phase cycle is not, however, evident in theinterwar experi-
ence. Stagflation is a quite rare event in the interwar years, appearing only
in 1926 and then with a relatively weak posterior probability. Theonly
other years of stagflation in the backcastoccur during World War II,
apparently reflecting the price and wage controls of that period.Since
stagIlation or cost-push inflation is deemed to bea relatively recent or
post-World War II phenomenon this may not be consideredtoo surprising.
lithe 1926 and wartime stagflations are ignored, then itcan be argued that
the three decades from 1920 through 1950are characterized by three
classic three-phase business cycles plusone aborted cycle of lhat kind,
with the three phases Proceeding in the expected order of recessionto
recovery to demand-pull and then back to recession. The three full cycles
are those of 1921 through 1924, 1924 through 1932, and 1938 through
1949 (with the war years looked uponas an interruption or aberration in
the sequence). The inconiplete two-stage cycle is that of 1932 through
1938 in which there are no signs of demand-pullor other inflationary
effects, just as in 1958-1959. Again, the 1937recovery, like that of 1959,
has often been described in the literature and commentaryas aborted.
An interesting question posed by this historical analysisis why the
postwar experience extrapolates so weU to the interwar experienceii
indeed a profound change occurred in the character of the business cycle
with the advent of new policy initiatives in the postwar period. The only
major difference, as already noted,is the apparent lack of much true
stagflation during the interwar years. But, rhetorically speaking, is a fourth
TABLE 7Peaks and Troughs in NBER Busins
Cycle Chronologya Since 1920
Peak Trough
January 1020 July 1921
May 1923 July 1924
October 1926 November1927
August 1929 March 1933
May 1937 June 1938
February 1945 October 1945
November1948 October j949
July 1953 August 1954
July 1957 April 1958
May 1960 February 1961
November1969 November1970S
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phase of the business cycle, stagtlatiun, a major contribution Ot postr
policy? The answer to that question almost certainly must remain anOpen
issue.
The other extrapolative lest that can be macic, of course, is toproject th
discriminant analyses forward to the periods alter those in which the basic
analysis was performed, that is, to months after Septenther 1 973. For those
months exactly the same data series are available as were used in the basic
or original analysis. The resLilts froni such a forward extrapolation (again
using no a priori specification of the character of these months, thatis,
giving them a so-called diffuse prior probability)is shown in Table 8
For the projections into late 1973 and early 1974, our tentativereading
of the available evidence is that just as in the interwaryears, stagflation
was skipped, with the economy slipping almost directly from deniandpull
into recession sometime latein1973 or early 1974, Specifically, the
discriminant analysis suggests that October through December1973 as
well as the first two months of1 974 should be classified as recession
months. However, March, April, June, and july 1974seem more accurately
classified as demand-pull. Starting in August 1974, though, theclassifica-
tion returns unmistakably to recession.
Explanations for these convolutions in the classificationsduring early
1974 are not difficult to identify. The classificationof the last three months
TABLE 8Extrapolation of Discriminant Classifications
to 1973 and 1974
- Posterior Probabilities
Demand-





















































































1973 and the first two months of 1974as recessionreflects the dampening effects on the eConomy of theArab ojl embargo There- emergence of inflation adominant in March, April,nd May Of(t74
corresponds to the special circurristaitcessurrounding the formal removal
of price controls in April arid the prioranticipation of that event, both in
the private and public sectors and perhaps particularlythe emergenceo
the so-called special industry settlements arrivedat just prior to decontrol
Current discussion has used the terni stagflationto describe the period
Ironì late 1973 through mid-1974. Stagflatioriis typically characterp7edj
(see Table 3) by small yet still positive growth inGNP coupled with
significant price inflation. The period fromNovember 1973 through July
1974 is different from other periods classifiedas stagflation. it is a period of
negative GNP growth coupled with substantialprice inflation, morea
mixture of demand-pull and recession thana "classical" stagflation aswe have defined the term (i.e., consistent withpre-1973 cycles).
While there cannot be much doubtas of this date (January 1 975) that the
U.S. economy is certainly in a state of recession, establishinga formal date
for its onset is severely complicated by thedistortions created by the oil
embargo and decontrol. Two good alternativesfor dating the initiation of
the recession exist: November 1973or August 1974. In a strict sense, the
usual diffusion criterion for the existence ofa formal "National Bureau
recession" was not met until late in1 974 (cf. G. Moore's article in this
issue). Similarly, total employment and total industrialproduction (lid not
weaken as in a recession until late in 1974, althoughreal GNP fell sharply
early in the year (again, cf. Moore's article). Onemoral almost surely to he
drawn from these complications is that historyrarely repeats itself in any
neat and orderly fashion.
(VI CONCURRENT FOUR-PHASE CYCLICAL ANALYSIS
Apart from the obvious oversimplifications embedded inany discrete
cycle taxonomy, another self-evident deficiency,at least for policy pur-
poses, in the classification scheme just presented is the use of quarterly
variables that will be available only aftera time lag. Policymaking is at
least thought to be facilitated if thestate of the economy can be evaluated
on the basis of variables that are available with onlya short time lag after
the actual fact.
To remedy this shortcoming, the basic four-phase scheme just defined
and outlined can be implemented using only readily available monthly
variables, i.e., those that are availableno later than a month and a half
after the end of the particular month under study.On this basis, eleven of
('lislu at i () P olF (( ) P ( )rl 1i J- I uiii ,ttio fl S 1t7the original twenty variables can be retained (specifically, all the varjah
marked with an M in the last or availability column ot [able 3) To
the
can be added other monthly variables'promptly'' availableand Which
niight be expected to act as proxy varrabics for thc quarteily
Variables
mainly dealing with the national income accounts, that Were used
in the
basic classification exercises outlined above. Specifically. Iron-, the
list c
eighteen monthly variables used by Ike Mintz 119721 in her study of
U.S
growth cycles we took eight to develop a group of nineteen
readjl
available vadables we call our policy analysis set. To this setexactlthe
same discriminant analysis techniques were applied as before, using
the
group or phase definitions established by the basic analysis, that
,ac
defined in Table 2.
A listing of these nineteen policy analysis variables, alongwith their
average values for the different phasesrecession, recovery, demandpull
and stagflationare shown in Table 9. Eleven of the variablesof Course
behave exactly as before, that is, as reported in Table 3, sincethey are th
monthly variables of the basic analysis. Six of the eightnew variables (the
new ones are listed at the top of Table 9) are mainlymeasures of output or
proxies for the quarterly GNP figures that figuredprominently in the
original analysis. These monthly outputmeasures seem to differentiate
about as strongly between the two growth periods,recovery and demand.
pull, and the stagnant periods, recession andstagflation. as the original
GNP figures. The other twonew variables, the change per month in the
Treasury bill and bond rates,seem to behave much like the prime rate used
in both analyses.
Assuming that the periodicityas defined in Table 2 is correct,a key
question when using only the monthlyvariables is how much, ifany,
accuracy is sacrificed by not waiting forthe quarterly variables. The loss in
accuracy would not seem to be toogreat, as shown by the data in Table
10. The major loss is forrecession periods, hut perhaps not ofa magnitude
to create substantial problemsor difficulties.
Itis interesting tocompare extrapolations of the policy analysisto late
1973 and early 1974 withthose oI the basic analysisas shown in Table 8
The policy analysisextrapolations are presented in Table11. Those for
1974 seem to beeven more ambiguous than theoriginal or basic analysis
extrapolations. Specifically, lessevidence exists of incipient recession late
in 1973 and early1974 using the policyanalysis rather than the basic set. This is almostcertainly due to the sharpdownturn in real GNP recorded in the first quarter of1 974 whichwas incorporated into the basic analysis but
not reflected in themonthly outputor production variables. Which of these two sets of variabIesthequarterly GNP figuresor the monthly figures should beconstrued to be the betterrepresentation of reality is, of course debatdble Forexample, some observershave contended that the sharp









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 10 Number of Cases Classified into Groups,
February 1 947-September 1973
'Most prohabe group.
downturn in real GNP in the first quarter of1 974 WaS at least Partiallya
statistical artuact created by deficiencies in the inventory valuationadjust-
ment and oIlier similar problems inherent in adjusting for pricechanges in
periods of substantial inflation. Furthermore, GNP(as contrasted with gross
domestic product, GDP) was affected by nationalizationof overseas prop.
TABLE 11Extrapolation of Discriminant Classificationto







I 973 October 0.667k 0.129 0.158 0.046
November 0.104 0.257 0.612k 0.027
4.
December 0.] 17 0.015 0.840' 0.027 ?
1974 January 0.016 0.007 0.977 0.000
February 0.647' 0.027 0.326 0.000
March o.000 0.001 0.999* 0.000
April 0.000 0.00r I .000' 0.000
I.-tc
May 0.000 0.001 (3999* 0.000
June 0.011 0.011 0.977' 0.001 ),_ July 0.000 0.001 0.99tJ 0.000 August 0.048 0.035 0.918* 0.000
September 0.995' 0.005 0.000 (1.000
October i MOO' 0.000 0.000 0.000
November 0.1389* 0. III 0.000 0.000
Original (Basic)
Phase
- Discriminant Analysis Classification
Recession Recovery Deinanil-PullStagfiatj0
Original Analysis Using Quarterly and Monthly Data
Recession 42 2 3
Recovery 6 1 08 0
Demand-pull (3 79
Stagflation 0 0 61
Policy Analysis Using Monthly Data Only
Recession 38 5
. 2
Recovery 1 0 I 03 2 0
Demand-pull 1 0 72 I I
Stagflation 0 0 12ClassiIiiatiofl ott(OflI)flnCFlu(-tljations
191
erties of U.S. companies, particularly oil holdings,during thisPeriod. The logic, though, of the present classificationscheme as wellatradtjonaj Nationaltireau methods, would Suggest thatthe 1jLIirterly GNPfigures be given substanhal weight in determining theexistence orF1OflPXi5tCflcof a recession. Thus, the balance of evidencetavors the basicset results i.e., with the quarterly GNP figures included. Theemergence of unequivocal
evidence of a recession phase by the end of1974 lends furtherciedibility to this conclusion in the sense that the basicset more clearly signaledthat stage and at an earlier (late than the policyset.
!V1I SUMMARY AND CONCLUDINGOBSERVATIONS
The empirical results presented in thisPaper seem to support thefollowing conclusions:
A four-phase cycle--recessjon,recovery, demand-pull, andstag-
flationcorrespondjng to the currentconventional wisdom about the char-
acter of the present-day business cyclecan be identified in time series data
chronichng postwar business activity inthe United States.
The appearance of all four of thesestages in all postwar business
cycles is not, though, a definitecertainty. In particular, the slagflation
phase seems ephemeral, not appearing inthe business cycles of the mid-
and late 1950s or in the niostcurrent cyclical experience.
Omission of a stagflation phaseseems even more a characteristic of
cyclical experiences (luring the interwaryears, that is, between 1920 and
1940. Indeed, the major difference between theprewar and postwar cycles
seems to be the almost total absence of any stagflationexperiences in the
former.
With the exception of the omission of thestagflation phase, how-
ever, the prewar cyclical experience wouldnot seem to be markedly
differentinitsbasic characteristics from that of thepostwar period.
Specifically, discrimiriant functions developedusing monthly and quarterly
data for the postwar period extrapolatewith remarkable consistency and
logic to the prewar experienceeven though this must be clone with
relatively crude annual data.
The discriminant analysis definitely tendsto confirm the conclusion
reached by National Bureau researchersusing less formal and more
historical techniques thata new business cycle recession almost surely
started sometime late in 197301 (luring 1974. The formalized or highly
structured discriminant analysis suggests that recession started eitherin
November 1973, which hasnow been adopted as the starting date of a









192 latinR. Meyerand DanjH. Weinberg
Obviously, these analyses andthe conclusions justsummarjzj hardly
point to an unequivocally simple definition ot the constituentsof a bu5.
ness cycle experience and, most particularly, the recession phase
t
cycle. The truth seems to be that business cycle experiencesrarely repeat
themselves in any neat, symmetrical, standard fashion. Indeedit would
appear that simple classification of cyclical experiences into
recession Or
nonrecession categories is not always very illuminatingor useful. Indeed,
Wesley C. Mitchell emphasized this longago (1927). When he idcntifi
each cycle in terms of nine stages, he divided eachof two mainphases
expansion and contraction, into four subphases. Hestudied the changes
between successive stages and analyzed the differencesamong the Phases,
and always emphasized that business cyclesvary widely in character
Given the complexity of modern economiesand the multiplicityof potential policy responses, farmore complex and detailed analysesmust
be made. In short, it is not enough simplyto assert that theeconomy is in
recession or not in recession, or even togo somewhat further, aswe have
done with the more complex classificationschemes tested in thispaper, and assert that theeconomy isin a state of recessionor recovery or
demand-pull or stagflation. Rather,one must go behind these classi(ica
tions into an examination of thebasic data to developa more comprehen..
sive, detailed, and sensitive analysisof the true cyclicalstate for meaning-
ful policy analyses. Our furtherresearch thus will he aimedprimarily at determining the usefulness ofour simple classificationfor improving historical andmacroeconomic analyses.APPENDIX APosterior ProbabilityClassifications of the











0.000 o.000 0.001 0.993 0.006 April 0.000 0.001 0.997* 0.002 May 0.006 0.001 0.992* 0 001 June 0.000 0.000 0.995* 0.005 July 0.000 0.000 0.994* 0.006 August 0.000 0.000 0.999* 0.001 September 0.000 0.000 0.978* 0.022 October 0.000 0.000 1.000* 0.000 November 0.000 0.000 0.99 7* 0 003 December 0.000 0.000 0.973* 0.027
1948 January o.000 0.000 0,956* 0.044
February 0.000 0.002 0.992* 0.006
March 0.001 0.002 0.995w' 0.002 April 0.002 0.001 0.987k 0.010
May 0.000 0.000 0.758* 0.242
June 0.000 0.000 0.510* 0.490
July 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.969*
August 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.700*
September o.000 0.000 0.05 1 0.949k
October o.000 0.000 0.168 0.831*
November 0.036 0.011 0.916* 0.037
December 0.700* 0.010 0.290 0.001
1949 January 0.999* 0.001 0.000 0.000
February i.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
March 0.997* 0.003 0.000 0.000
April 0.962* 0.038 0.000 0.000
May 0.907* 0.093 0.000 0.000
June 0.865* 0.134 0.000 0.000
July 0.817* 0.183 0.000 0.000
August 0.896 0.104 0.000 0.000
September 0.991 0.009 0.000 0.000
October 0.996 0.004 0.000 0.000
November 0.288 0.712* 0.000 0.000
December o,00i 0.999* 0.000 0.000
195Q January 0,000 0.991* 0.007 0.001
February o.000 0.999k 0.001 0.000
March o.00i 0.999* 0.000 0.000
April 0.002 0.998 0.000 0.000
May 0.002 0.996* 0.002 0.000
June o.000 0.962* 0.038 0.000APPENDIX A(continued)
}'octerior Probabilities -
[)enianrj-
Year Month RecessionRecovery jkjll StagIal
july 0.001) 0.072 0.028' t) 000
August 0.000 0.0 I1 0. ')8 D
). (102
September 0.001) (3. U0) 0.0 ')O' 0.0(0 ( )ctober 0.000 1)005 (). 9*)
1). 002
November 0.000 0.002 OMYm 0007
De ember 0.000 0000 0.987'
1951 January 0.000 0.000 0 ss
I-ebrriary 1)000 0.000 0.009 0.991
March 0.000 0.000 0.018
April 0.000 0.001) 0.01 2 0.988 May 0.000 0.000 0.00 () 99*
Jour' 0.000 0.00(1 0. 113 0 883'
ul 0.000 0.000 0.098 0 902 *
August 0.000 0.001) 0.01 9 0.981'
September 0.000 0.000 0.056
October o.000 0.000 0.062 0.938' November 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.917' December o.000 0.01)0 0.033 0.967'
1952 January o.000 0.000 0.063 0.937*
February 0.000 0.000 0.114 0886' March o.000 0.000 0.00.5 0.995*
April 0.000 1)001) 0.001 0.999 May 0.001) 0.000 0.005 0.995*
tune 0.000 0.01)0 0.008 0.992*
July 0.000 0.000 (1.012 0 988* August o.000 (1.000 0. 100 0.900' September o.000 0.000 0.011 0.989' October 0.000 0.000 0.999' November 0.000 0.000 0.002 099' December 1)000 0.000 0.005 0 995'
1953 January 0.000 0.000 004*) 0.951*
February 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.983* March 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.991' April 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.993' May 0.000 0.000 0.021 0,979' June t).000 0.000 0.014 0.986* July 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.981' August 0.000 0.000 (1.010 0.990*
Septeniber 0.001 0.000 0.046 0.953' October 0.00j 0.001) 0.028 0.971' November 0.207 0.001 0.307 0.485' December 0.960' 0.01)1 0.039 0.0(11APPENDIX A(continued)
Posterior Probabijes-
Defllan(i. Year Month RecessionRecover'/ Pull Stagflatjjn
1954 January 0.998 0.001 0.001 0.001) February 0993*
0.007 0.000 0.000 March 0.961 0.039 0.000 0.000 April 0.927* 0.072 0.002 0 000 May 0.549* 0.451 0.000 0.000 June 0.718* 0.281 0.001 0000 July 0.685k 0.314 0.000 0.000 August 0.259 0.741* 0.000 0.000 September 0.063 0.937* 0.000 0.000 October 0.008 0.982* 0.009 0.000 November 0.005 0.982* 0.013 0.000 December 0.004 0.936* 0.059 0.000
1955 January 0.021 0.949* 0.030 0.000 February 0.021 0.513* 0.465 0.002 March 0.008 0.243 0.709* 0.040 April 0.004 0.115 0.797* 0.084 May 0.002 0.210 0.455* 0.333 June 0.002 0.160 0.794* 0.043 July 0.000 0.042 0.911 0.046 August o.00i 0.0 16 0.978* 0 005 September 0.000 0.003 0.956* 0041 October 0.002 0.077 0.827 0.094 November 0.001 0.020 0.747* 0.23 December o.000 0.002 0.749* 0.249
1956 january 0.047 (1.008 0.587* 0.358 February 0.000 0.001 0.184 0.815*
March o.000 0.001 0.618* 0.381
Apr (jUDO 0.000 0.856* 0.144 May 0.003 0.003 0.852* 0.142
June 0.092 0.015 0.824* 0.069
July 0.261 0.020 0.683* 0.035
August 0.016 0.002 Q979* 0.003
September o.000 0.001 0.835* 0.164
October o.000 0.001 0.137 0.862W
November 0.000 0.004 0.933* 0.063
December o.000 0.004 0.851* 0.146
1957 January o.00g 0.001 0.987* 0.003
February o.00i 0.000 0.882* 0.116
March 0.004 0.002 0.578* 0.416
April 0.003 0.00 1 0.506* 0.490
May 0.009 0.006 0.921* 0.065











July 0.006 0.009 0.980' 0.00 5
August 0.011 0.006 0.975' 0.008
September 0.729' 0.022 0.243 0 oo7
October 0.994' 0.00 1 0.005
November 0.999* 0.00 1 0.000 o.000
December 1.000' 0.000 0.000 0.000
1958 January 1.000' 0.000 0.000 0.000
February 1.000' 0.000 0.000 0000
March 0.999' 0.001 0.000 0.000
April 0.983* 0.017 0.000 0.000
May 0.551' 0.449 0.000 0.000
tune 0.03 1 0.969' 0.000 0.000
July 0.001 0.999' 0.000 0.000
August 0.000 1 .000' 0.000 o.000
September 0.000 0.999' 0.000 0.000
October 0.002 0.998' 0.000 0.000
November 0.019 0.980' 0.001 0.000
December 0.100 0.899' 0.001 0.000
1959 January 0.094 0.905' 0.000 0.000
February 0.015 0.984' 0.001 0.000
March 0.000 0.999w 0.001 0.000
April 0.000 0.989' 0.011 0.000
May 0.004 0.943' 0.052 0.001
June 0.396 0.461' 0.131 0.011
July 0.963' 0.022 0.014 0.002
August 0.946' 0.05 1 0.003 0.000
September 0.164 0.832' 0.004 0.000
October 0.010 0.990' 0.000 0.000
November 0.014 0.985' 0.000 0.000




































































1961 January 0.948 0.052 O.000(jrJü February
March
0.278 0.722* 0.000 0.000 0.046 Q954*
0.000 0.000 April 0.056 0.944* 0.000 0.000 May 0.030 0.970 0.000 0.000 June 0.009 0.991* 0.000 0.000 July 0.018 0.982* 0.000 0.000 August 0.011 0.989* 0.000 0.000 September 0.005 0.995* 0.000 0.000 October 0.015 0.985* 0.000 0.000
November 0.009 0.990* 0.001 0.000 December 0.028 0.968 0.004 0.000
1962 January 0.019 0.977* o.00 o.000
February 0.002 0.983* 0.016 0.000
March 0.001 0.997* 0.002 0.000
April 0.003 Ø9944 0.003 0.000
May 0.071 0.927* 0.002 0.000
June 0.396 0.603* 0.001 0.000
July 0.503* 0.467 0.030 0.000
August 0.410 0.588* 0.002 0.000
September 0.238 0.758* 0.004 0.000
October 0.592* 0.406 0.002 0.000
November 0.091 0.907k 0.003 0.000
December 0.057 0.935* 0.008 0.000
1963 January 0.053 0.923* 0.024 0.000
February 0.023 0.976* 0.001 0.000
March 0.047 0.952* 0.001 0.000
April 0.046 0.952k 0.001 0.000
May 0.053 0.947* 0.000 0.000
June 0.005 0.993* 0.002 0.000
July 0.005 0.990* 0.005 0.000
August 0.002 0.984* 0.014 0.000
September 0.014 Q933* 0.002 0.000
October 0.041 0.952* 0.007 0.000
November 0.018 0.979* 0.003 0.000
December 0.064 0.829* 0.108 0.000
1964 January 0.051 0.922 0.027 0.000
February 0.02 1 0.893* 0.086 0.000
March 0.025 0.957* 0.018 0.000
April 0.042 0.888* 0.070 0.000
May 0.02 1 0.924* 0.055 0.001



































































































































































































































1969 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.832* February 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.962* March 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.962* April 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.977* May 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.987- June 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.861* July 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.984* August o.000 0.000 0.024 0.976* September 0.000 0.0(10 0.087 0.913* October 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.9 lOt November 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.936* December o.000 0.000 0.877* 0.122
January
APPENDIX A(continued)
1970 January 0.356 0.001 0.384 0.258 February
March
0.675* 0.015 0.270 0.040 0.969* 0.021 0.007 0.003 April 0.333 0.102 0.550* 0.016 May 0.204 0.042 Q743* 0.010 lune 0.824* 0.050 0.125 0.000 July 0.291 0577* 0.132 0.000 August 0.686* 0.304 0.010 0.000
September 0.877* 0.122 0.001 0.000 October (1999* 0.001 0.000 0.000
November 0.998* 0.002 0.000 0.000
December 0.013 0.987* 0.000 0.000
1971 January 0.008 0.992 0.000 0.000
February 0.016 0.984* 0.000 0.000
March 0.165 0.830w 0.005 0.000
April 0.023 0.929* 0.048 0.000
May 0.058 0.937 0.006 0.000




0.000 0.052 0 948
0.001 0.182 0818*
0.000 0.056 0 944*
























































































































































Bsine; ConcljljU,bDigest (BCD) Man-hours in flOIlclgriCuitural establishnienic BCD
Number of employees on nonagncultural
payrolls
BCD
Wages and salaries in mining, manufacturing,
and CoflStiuction BCD
Gross national product, current dollars BCD
Gross national product, 1958 dollars BCD




Retail sales, current dollars
BCD
Output per man-hour, private economy BCD
Compensation per man-hour, privateeconomyBureau of Labor Statistics(BLS) index of unit labor cost, Privateeconomy BCO
Money supply (Mi, M2) BCD
Net exports as per cent of GNP BCD
Gross government receipts andexpenditures Survey of CurrentBusiç5 (SCB) implicit price deflator BCD
Consumer price index (CPu BCD
Consumer price index, food
Eccinoquic Indicators (El) Consumer price index, all conimoditiesless
food
El
Wholesale price index (WPI) BCD
Wholesale price index, industrialcommoditiesBCD
Prime rate, 90-day paper
Federal Reserve Board Bulletin Average yields on corporate bonds Moody's
Treasury bill rate
BCD
Treasury bond yields BCD
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)composite
stock price index
SCB Weekly Statistics
Source